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Abstract 
This paper examines a second home market near Heavenly Ski Resort in South Lake Tahoe, CA 
to understand historical pricing behaviors and to forecast future prices using an econometric 
model derived from economic, demographic, and climate data. 
 
In order to do this study, we gathered historical residential sales data from 1988 to 2008 for the 
study area, which is limited to residential houses located within a one-mile radius of the resort.  
Moreover, other external variables, such as Tahoe skier visits, natural snowfall, San Francisco 
Bay Area income and employment, and mortgage interest rates, were collected for the same time 
period to determine how these variables influenced the prices. First, using approximately 550 
residential sales data, a price index was created and subsequently historical residential home 
pricing behaviors were analyzed.  Typically, evaluation of house prices is difficult since each 
residential property is a composite of goods that contain varying amounts of attributes. Therefore, 
the hedonic house price model was applied to recognize and remove effects of the housing-
specific attributes on pricing. As a result, the real price index tracks only real prices as a function 
of time. Over the 20 years of study period, two distinct trends were observed.  The real prices 
remained flat for the first 10 years and increased substantially in the second 10 years. Overall, 
the real price index linearly trended upwards. Employing the real price index and the external 
variables, a series of equations was developed as the foundation of an econometric model.  The 
econometric model utilizes the following equation:  New Permits (a measure of supply) and 
Tahoe Skier Visits (a measure of demand), to forecast future supply and demand. The future 
projections with relevant economic variables then were put into Stock and Real Price (a measure 
of residential prices) equations to establish future prices. Using the econometric model, we 
employed three scenarios portraying future economic conditions to examine the pricing 
behaviors: realistic, optimistic, and pessimistic.  In reaction to moderate snowfall and economic 
growth in the realistic scenario, the real prices slope downward immediately and then upward. 
With a higher economic growth and a phenomenal snowfall, the optimistic scenario predicts the 
highest price appreciation through increase in demand.  The pessimistic scenario is the only one 
in which the significant price decline is predicted.  
 3 
This study concludes that residential home prices will continue to increase in all cases except for 
the pessimistic scenario, in which there are poor economic conditions and a light snowfall. 
Another conclusion is that the existing housing stock is confined and outdated due to the 
maturity of this market as well as new development restrictions imposed by the local authority.   
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1.0 Introduction 
Until 2007, when the US economy finally came to a halt from a record expansion, a growing 
number of American and foreign investors purchased and built second homes1.  Since the early 
1990, the second home market has emerged as a dominant force in determining and influencing 
urban and regional development as a result of its seasonal redistribution of the population.  
Furthermore, second home development, due to the solid growth of the upper income market, 
near resort areas has created a thriving niche in the real estate industry.  According to Renshaw, 
in 1967 there were only 1,547,000 second homes in the United States for about 59 million 
households2.  Since then, the size of the second home market has grown significantly.  By 2007 
approximately 7.5 million second homes were located throughout this country, a figure expected 
to increase by 125,000 a year over the next decade3.   
 
The U.S. ski resort industry has also expanded over 
the past decades.  Although the number of ski resorts 
has decreased from 622 in 1988 to 431 in 2007, as a 
result of a period of consolidation and attrition, the 
industry’s revenue has increased for the last 10 years 
from $1.6 billion in 1997 to $2.4 billion in 20084.  In 
addition, the number of skier visits has grown from 
46 million during the 1982-1983 season to a record 
                                               
1
 The term “second home” is defined as a dwelling unit that is not one's principal residence.  It refers to an occasional-use property for 
households whose primary residence is located elsewhere.  Second homes are mostly found in rural or resort areas, such as lakes, 
beaches, and mountains, where they are used for leisure, recreation, and vacation purposes.  They are often rented out to others when not 
in use by current owners.  
2
 Edward F. Renshaw, “The Demand for Housing in the Mid-1970's”, Land Economics, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Aug., 1971),  pp. 249-255 
3
 ‘Talking Points: Second Homes”, National Association of Realtors, May 08, 2008 
4
 “Ski Resorts in the US”, IBIS World Industry Report, Nov. 27, 2007 
Figure 1.1 US Ski Industry Revenue 
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high of 60 million during 2007-2008 the season5.  The growth in winter destinations will likely 
continue strong, leading to optimism about the following years. 
 
This paper is the case study of a real estate market near Heavenly Ski Resort in South Lake 
Tahoe, CA to examine historical pricing behaviors and to forecast future prices using an 
econometric model derived from economic, demographic, and climate data.  
 
1.1 Approach 
We focus on one particular real estate market, because of its location and resort characteristics, 
near Heavenly Ski Resort in South Lake Tahoe, CA.  Located in the valley of the Sierra Nevada 
Mountain Range at Monument Peak, straddling the state line between California and Nevada, 
Heavenly Ski Resort is the only bi-state ski resort in the United States, and is one of North 
America's largest ski areas with 4,800 acres of terrain.  Its close proximity to Lake Tahoe and 
casinos, as well as its four-season activities, have made Heavenly Ski Resort an attractive 
vacation place.  Also, as one of many alpine ski resorts around Lake Tahoe, it is the only isolated 
one located in South Lake Tahoe. Because of its isolation, we can minimize the influence of 
other resort markets.  In addition, the Heavenly resort area displays typical ski resort 
characteristics, offering a variety of activities, ranging from water skiing to golf,  that can be 
enjoyed by people of all ages.  For this reason, the second home market is considered to be a 
significant component of the residential development in this region. 
 
 
 
                                               
5
 “US Ski Industry Sets of New Record”, The Aspen Times, June 4, 2008  
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1.2 Data and Modeling  
The research will be based primarily on quantitative analysis of historical resort home prices and 
divided into two main sections.   First, utilizing a hedonic house price model, a real price index 
for Heavenly Ski Resort will be created.  Evaluation of house prices is difficult because each 
residential property is a composite of goods that contain varying amounts of attributes.  
Therefore, by applying regression analysis to the sales data, the hedonic house price model will 
be created in order to recognize and account for the independent variables that influence prices6.  
This method allows us to make apple-to-apple comparisons of those houses.  From this model, a 
real price index will be developed to trace real property prices as a function of time.  Secondly, 
using a real price index and other economic variables pertaining to this market, we will create a 
series of equations to develop an econometric model that helps forecast the future real estate 
prices based on three economic conditions: realistic, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios. 
 
In order to perform this research, we gathered the following data.  
1. Residential sales transaction data                                          Model: Real Price Index 
2. New residential permits (supply) 
3. Tahoe area skier visits (demand)   
4. Various independent and exogenous variables                                                        
a. SF Bay Area employment                                         Forecast: Future Prices                                                                                                                                                                              
b. SF Bay Area per capita income    
c. Mortgage interest rates 
d. Heavenly snowfall 
                                               
6
 Miller, Norman G. " Residential Property Hedonic Pricing Models: A Review", Research in Real Estate (1982, Volume 2), pp. 20-23. 
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2.0 Background Information 
 
 Figure 2.1 Location of Lake Tahoe in relation to San Francisco Bay Area 
 
Located approximately 200 miles from San Francisco and 100 miles from Sacramento, the 
capital of California, Lake Tahoe, which lies along the border between California and Nevada, 
was discovered by explorers, John Fremont and Kit Carson, in 1844.  Lake Tahoe was once a 
summer gathering place for three bands of peaceful Washoe Indians.  By the turn of the century, 
wealthy citizens of San Francisco began to recognize the beauty of the lake and terrain, which 
became a haven for the well-to-do. 
 
 Tahoe's first resort was built in 1863 at Glenbrook to provide the leisured aristocracy of the 
booming Comstock with a vacation spot conveniently located at the head of the new turnpike to 
Carson City, Nevada.  The first privately owned vacation "cottage" was built that same year at 
Emerald Bay.  Additionally, the popular hotels of the era- including Tallac House, Tahoe Tavern 
and Glenbrook Inn- were built around this period.  During the 1920’s and 1930’s, as the roads 
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through the mountains became paved, it attracted a greater number of people, leading to a rapid 
growth of smaller, middle class lodges.   
 
At the end of World War II, Tahoe still had only about a thousand permanent residents in the 
villages.  By the late 1940’s, Tahoe vacation resorts were turning away customers, and new ones 
were being built to accommodate the overflow.  After the War, thus, the 20th century began to 
arrive at Tahoe with such rapid growth in population, and the impact resulting from this, that 
conditions at the lake went rapidly out of control    
 
However, the development around Lake Tahoe did not start until the late 1950’s.  Roads to the 
Basin began to be plowed year-round, enabling permanent residence.  Skiing, which had not yet 
become popular on the West Coast, became the fashionable wintertime equivalent of tennis.  In 
the early 1950’s, Tahoe's recreational potential had caught the attention of everyone on the 
Pacific Coast, including Nevada gamblers.  As a result, many casinos were built.  At about the 
same time, ski resorts began to multiply.  Eventually, this development on Lake Tahoe 
transformed from a busy summer vacation spot to a brawling year-round affair.  Finally, Lake 
Tahoe became recognized as skiing Mecca of the Western United States soon after the 1960 
Winter Olympic at Squaw Valley.   
. 
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2.1 The Study Area: Heavenly Ski Resort 
Located in the south eastern corner of Lake  
Tahoe, Heavenly Ski Resort is one of 14 ski 
resorts clustered around the lake.  It is 
recognized as one of the largest in North 
America, attracting more than one million 
ski visitors a year.  Opened as a relatively 
small ski area in the late 1940’s, Heavenly 
Ski Resort ushered in a new era beginning 
in 1964, with the success of the 1960 Winter 
Olympics and an ownership change to Hugh 
Killebrew, a successful attorney from San 
Francisco.  As new owner, Killebrew 
envisioned expanding Heavenly into Nevada, the adjoining state. In 1967, his vision became a 
reality when Heavenly became America’s largest ski area.   
 
After going through a series of ownership changes, the resort was purchased by Vail Resorts in 
2002 from American Skiing Company.  Offering 30 lifts and 95 runs distributed between 
California and Nevada, the resort had a 4,800 acre permit, with approximately 33 percent of the 
area developed for skiing.  Heavenly offers Lake Tahoe's highest summit elevation: a peak 
elevation of 10,067 feet, a peak lift-service elevation of 10,040 feet, and a vertical rise of 3,500 
feet. 
 
Figure 2.2 Lake Tahoe Ski Resorts 
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Differentiating itself from other ski resorts around Lake Tahoe in terms of size and proximity to 
other activities, Heavenly Ski Resort has truly become a popular year-around vacation 
destination for people of all ages.  Heavenly continues to attract more people to this area 
annually, where the population has grown at an annual rate of 5.6 percent in the past decade7.  
 
2.2 South Lake Tahoe Real Estate Market Condition 
As the economy of the U.S. expanded, there was a huge increase in the number of people with 
more money to disperse.  Aided by subprime mortgages as well as by solid growth in the higher 
income individual, the U.S. real estate market has experienced a dramatic increase in prices.  As 
seen in Figure 2.3, the average U.S. median home prices rose from $112,500 in 1988 to $246,500 
in 2006 with an average growth rate of 6.6 percent.  The median home prices began to decrease 
after 2006 due to unusual disruptions in the mortgage market.  According to the National 
Association of Realtors, the median prices fell 7.7 percent to $196,300 in Q1 2008 down 
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  Figure 2.3 Median Home Prices; US vs. South Lake Tahoe (source: US Census & City-Data)  
                                               
7
 Claritas Report., 2007 
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from $212,600 for the same period a year ago.  It was the largest year-over-year decline since the 
NAR started keeping comprehensive records of median home prices in 19798.  Similar trend has 
been observed in South Lake Tahoe, though with much higher prices.   
 
Generally speaking, South Lake Tahoe had been under priced for many years.  Lots purchased in 
the 1970s for $ 6,500 had stayed close to that price for decades.  Although the prices remained 
fairly static until 1988, from 1988 to1990, they rose by more than 20 percent.  During the “Dot 
Com” bubble in late 1999 to 2000, the people in the entire San Francisco Bay Area, as well as 
Silicon, Valley had abundance of cash and recognized the affordable resort area of Tahoe. Tahoe 
had fallen behind in valuations compared to other resort areas like Colorado, whose popularity as 
a resort was much higher.  Hence, as a vacation place, the Tahoe area has been attractive to the 
affluent San Francisco Bay area population for many years, and a high percentage of the 
residential sales during that period went to second home owners.  Due to the fact that the local 
economy did not generate high income job for the local population, many skiers who lived in 
Tahoe could not possibly compete for the available homes with prices driven by outside buyers. 
 
As the outsiders’ interests in second home ownership increased, multiple offers and bidding wars 
ensued.  As a result, the residential real estate market exploded, and the prices began to rise 20 to 
30 percent a year until August 2005.  It was not unusual that houses previously listed at $300,000 
were selling at over $400,000.  In extreme cases, if one had bought a house worth $200,000 in 
2000, one probably could have sold it for around $700,000 in 20059.  The entire Lake Tahoe 
regions, including South Lake Tahoe, experienced nearly similar increases in prices between 
1999 and 2005.  
                                               
8
 “NAR”, Realtor Real Estate News, REALTORS Magazine Online, May 13,2008 
9
 Jim Stahl, Personal Interview, June 19, 2008 
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There are several reasons that led to the big run-up in pricing behaviors.  First, the trends were 
observed nationally.  Most major cities in the US were experiencing the same phenomenon over 
the same course of years.  Second, the mortgage interest rates were relatively low. They made 
available for people borrow more cheaply.  Additionally, the liberal mortgage lending practices 
led people to borrow more money than they could afford, causing a higher housing demand.  
Furthermore, interest in vacation homes at Tahoe by non-residents was keen.  Lastly, when the 
stock market crashed in 2000, many were looking for alternative venues for investments and 
recognizing the investment returns in real estate.   
 
Another plausible cause for the price appreciation is that the Lake Tahoe area has been under 
building restrictions imposed by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (or TRPA).  TRPA was 
established in 1969 through a bi-state compact between California and Nevada, which was 
approved by the U.S. Congress.  The agency is assigned to coordinate and regulate development 
and to protect the environment of the Lake Tahoe Basin through land-use regulations and is one 
of only a few watershed-based regulatory agencies in the United States.  
 
In the last 40 years the lake had deteriorated rapidly due to increased land development in the 
Lake Tahoe Basin.  In 1968, problems associated with burgeoning development around the lake 
prompted California and Nevada to create TPRA.  In 1972, TPRA adopted a land use ordinance, 
but numerous exceptions failed to sufficiently limit development and preserve the environmental 
integrity of the lake.  In 1980, TPRA was directed to develop regional "environmental threshold 
carrying capacities" and adopt an amended regional plan that achieved and maintained those 
carrying capacities.  As a result, prior to May 1983, TPRA prohibited the development of new 
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subdivisions, condominiums, and apartment buildings.  Moreover, building permits were limited 
to the number granted in 1978. 
 
Despite its good faith efforts, TPRA concluded that it was unable to adopt a permanent plan by 
the May 1983 deadline.  TPRA, therefore, enacted an ordinance and a resolution "which 
completely suspended all project reviews and approvals, including the acceptance of new 
proposals," and which remained in effect until a new regional plan was adopted on April 26, 
1984.  In combination, these land use measures effectively banned all construction on areas near 
streams and wetlands in the Basin for almost 3 years.  Furthermore, private landowners in the 
Basin contended that the mere enactment of these temporary land use regulations denied them of 
all economic use of their property for the period these measures were in effect.  As a result, the 
landowners claimed TPRA had an unqualified constitutional obligation to offer compensation for 
the value of a parcel's use during the period development was prohibited10. 
 
The market is currently in a re-adjustment phase following the establishment of thorough TRPA 
regulations covering most types of developments in the Lake Tahoe Basin.  Even with the lifting 
of the total building moratorium, land development in the area is, at best, time consuming and 
extremely costly.  This organization has control of all development in the area relating 
specifically to uses allowed, and to the amount of land coverage by structural or other man-made 
improvements to be allowed on individual sites.  Additionally, approval must be granted by juris-
diction of the county in which a proposed development is planned.   
 
                                               
10
 Frank A. Shepherd, “The Supreme Courts Latest Word on Regulatory Taking”, <www.vsb.org> 
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Typically, government regulations play a major role in controlling the housing supply.  Some 
governmental regulations make it difficult and expensive for builders to obtain permits to start 
building in an area, hence creating a barrier of entry for construction companies.  This acts as a 
deterrent for the builders because their profit margin will not be as large as they would like, and 
therefore they will relocate their construction where they will receive a greater profit margin. 
However, it is very difficult to conclude that the building regulations are related to the price 
appreciation in this market, since the new permits (new construction) data we gathered did not 
indicate any signs of limitation in residential construction. 
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3.0 The Real Estate Prices  
There are approximately 14,500 residential units, excluding rentable apartments, in South Lake 
Tahoe.  Out of 14,500 homes, approximately 300 residential units, located within the one mile 
radius of the resort, were selected for the study.  These selected houses will act as a real estate 
indicator and represent the real estate market of the entire resort area.  
 
In order to examine what has influenced the real estate prices in the study area, a real price index 
is constructed using the actual sales data.  The sales data contains the following information; 
multiple sales dates, locations, ages of house, and their physical attributes, such as size, number 
of bedrooms and baths.  The sales data of those selected homes was obtained through primarily 
two sources: El Dorado County Assessor’s Office and Real Estate Research Firm, which 
specializes in Northern California Market.  Unfortunately, the earliest data available is after 1988.  
Therefore, the time frame of historical price analysis is 20 years, from 1988 to 2008.  Some of 
the data has missing information and some has the transaction dates prior to the construction date.  
Those were identified as lot sales and excluded from the analysis, totaling 537 observations.  
 
 
3.1 Data Analysis 
 
Typical House  (Average) 
Observations 537 
Bath 2.1 
Bed 2.8 
Size (sqft) 1644 
Age (years) 23.4 
 
Table 3.1 
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 Figure 3.1 Average Home Prices and Home Sales Occurred in the Study Area 
 
As seen in Figure 3.1, it is evident that the average home prices in the study area have escalated 
from $151,262 in 1988 to $522.25 in 2008, a 245 percent price appreciation in 20 years.  
However, there would have been a higher price appreciation if we had excluded last three years 
from this analysis.  A Similar trend is observed when adjusted for inflation, but less in magnitude.  
The prices remained relatively steady from 1988 to 1998.  However, prices began to increase 
rapidly from 1999 until 2006, with sudden spikes in 2000, 2002 and 2006.  During this period, 
the nominal prices escalated more than 380 percent, which equates to an annual growth rate of 
32 percent.  Thereafter, the prices dropped 27%, from $711,804 in 2006 to $522,250 in 2008.  In 
a comparison between prices and home sales, it is difficult to understand how the prices are 
correlated to the home sales.  For example, a number of the home sales were increasing from 
1988 to 1990, but the prices were not influenced by this increase.  From 1997 to 2001, the 
average home prices increased while the home sales began to fall during the same period.  As 
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mentioned previously, the ascending trends in prices have mainly been caused by the following: 
low interest rate, solid regional economy growth, and investment in real estate as alternative 
investing venue after the stock market’s crash in 2000.  Additionally, the discovery of Tahoe 
area as an affordable resort area drove demand higher, causing these price appreciations.   
 
3.2 Price Index 
In order to construct a price index, the sales data was regressed against to the natural log of price 
per square feet.  Time dummy variables were inserted to estimate the coefficients of years that 
are related to the logarithm of price.  Using only home specific physical characteristic and time 
dummy variables, the regression analysis was performed.  
 
Before constructing a price index, it is important to examine the regression results to better 
understand which independent variables had significant impact on prices.  When examining the 
result, there are a few variables with a negative coefficient.  These variables will have negative 
effects on prices, meaning home buyers tend to pay less for the next incremental bedrooms and 
ages of the building.  In contrast, ones with positive coefficients, such as baths and size of 
building, are recognized as more valuable than those with a negative sign, and buyers will pay 
much higher prices for houses with those specific amenities.  Utilizing on the regression result, 
the following equation is used to construct a price index for a typical house near Heavenly Ski 
Resort.  
Price/sf = e [4.3 + 0.048 x Baths – 0.017 x Beds + 0.00002 x Size – 0.005 x Ages + Y1989+...+Y2008] 
Typical House  (Average) 
Bath Bed Size(sqft) Age (years) 
2.1 2.8 1644 23.4 
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 Heavenly Price Index Regression: 
Natural Log of (Price / sf) :  
 
       
Goodness of fit statistics: 
 
     
Observations 536.000      
Sum of weights 536.000      
DF 511.000      
R² 0.678      
Adjusted R² 0.663      
MSE 0.132      
RMSE 0.363      
MAPE 4.957      
DW 1.779      
Cp 25.000      
AIC 
-1061.979      
SBC 
-954.875      
PC 0.353      
 
Analysis of  variance: 
     
       
Source DF Sum of squares Mean squares F Pr > F  
Model 24 141.772 5.907 44.835 < 0.0001  
Error 511 67.326 0.132    
Corrected Total 535 209.098        
     
Model parameters: 
     
      
Source Value Standard error t Stat P-value Lower bound (95%) Upper bound (95%) 
Intercept 4.348 0.110 39.362 < 0.0001 4.131 4.566 
Baths 0.048 0.033 1.448 0.148 -0.017 0.112 
Beds -0.017 0.025 -0.686 0.493 -0.066 0.032 
SqFt 0.000 0.000 -0.613 0.540 0.000 0.000 
Ages -0.005 0.002 -2.261 0.024 -0.009 -0.001 
Y1989 -0.014 0.102 -0.137 0.891 -0.213 0.186 
Y1990 0.148 0.099 1.498 0.135 -0.046 0.343 
Y1991 0.238 0.111 2.146 0.032 0.020 0.457 
Y1992 0.178 0.136 1.314 0.189 -0.088 0.445 
Y1993 0.310 0.105 2.967 0.003 0.105 0.516 
Y1994 0.244 0.104 2.353 0.019 0.040 0.447 
Y1995 0.346 0.117 2.952 0.003 0.116 0.576 
Y1996 0.277 0.122 2.279 0.023 0.038 0.516 
Y1997 0.299 0.099 3.021 0.003 0.105 0.493 
Y1998 0.416 0.101 4.123 < 0.0001 0.218 0.615 
Y1999 0.315 0.103 3.060 0.002 0.113 0.518 
Y2000 0.770 0.106 7.255 < 0.0001 0.562 0.979 
Y2001 0.915 0.113 8.073 < 0.0001 0.692 1.138 
Y2002 1.103 0.106 10.370 < 0.0001 0.894 1.312 
Y2003 1.302 0.110 11.781 < 0.0001 1.085 1.519 
Y2004 1.369 0.109 12.619 < 0.0001 1.156 1.582 
Y2005 1.562 0.110 14.185 < 0.0001 1.346 1.778 
Y2006 1.691 0.132 12.781 < 0.0001 1.431 1.951 
Y2007 1.486 0.127 11.692 < 0.0001 1.237 1.736 
Y2008 1.536 0.143 10.743 < 0.0001 1.255 1.816 
  Table 3.2 
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From the “price per square feet” equation and the typical home chart above, a nominal price 
index is constructed.  Then, selecting year 1988 as a base year, the CPI Index is applied to 
remove inflation out of the prices and to create a real price index.  
 
Year  
ln(price/sf) of  
Typical Home 
Nominal Price 
Index(p/sf) Yearly CPI 
Real Price Index  
(p/sf) ('88 dollars) 
1988 4.25726862 $70.62 118.3 $70.62 
1989 4.24341357 $69.65 124.0 $66.44 
1990 4.40554018 $81.90 130.7 $74.13 
1991 4.49575538 $89.64 136.2 $77.86 
1992 4.43569433 $84.41 140.3 $71.17 
1993 4.56775814 $96.33 144.5 $78.86 
1994 4.50113323 $90.12 148.2 $71.94 
1995 4.60335015 $99.82 152.4 $77.48 
1996 4.53462287 $93.19 156.9 $70.26 
1997 4.55624821 $95.23 160.5 $70.19 
1998 4.67376576 $107.10 163.0 $77.73 
1999 4.57270328 $96.81 166.6 $68.74 
2000 5.02731428 $152.52 172.2 $104.78 
2001 5.17236580 $176.33 177.1 $117.79 
2002 5.36000056 $212.73 179.9 $139.90 
2003 5.55905616 $259.58 184.0 $166.93 
2004 5.62640998 $277.66 188.9 $173.89 
2005 5.81916126 $336.69 195.3 $203.94 
2006 5.94874113 $383.27 201.6 $224.91 
2007 5.74374715 $312.23 207.3 $178.15 
2008 5.79293608 $327.97 215.6 $179.96 
 
  Table 3.3 Nominal Price Index vs. Real Price Index 
 
 
Adjusted for inflation, the real price index reveals a several things about the real estate market in 
South Lake Tahoe for the last 20 years.  As described earlier in this chapter, the median house 
prices had a steady increase from 1998 to 2006, and it has been falling thereafter.  The similar 
pricing behaviors are found in the South Lake Tahoe market.  The real price index shows that the 
prices escalated from $70.62/SF in 1988 to $179.96/SF in 2008, approximately a 155 percent 
increase in 20 years.  To identify pricing trends, the analysis is broken down to two phases: one 
from 1988 to 1999 and the other from 2000 to 2008.   First, during the first period, the real prices 
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remained fairly static; $70.62 in 1988 to $68.74 in 1999.  When inflation is added, however, the 
nominal price index exhibits a steady climb until 1998, from $70.62 in 1988 to $96.81 in 1999.  
The average inflation during this phase was 3.25 percent, which was much higher than that of the 
later period.  On the other hand, the price appreciation from 1999 to 2006 communicates a 
completely different story.  The nominal prices escalated by nearly 300% during this 7 year time 
period.  Adjusted for inflation, the real prices increased 227%, beginning in 1999 at $68.74 to 
ending in 2006 at $224.91.  The prices have been falling since 2006.  
 
It is very interesting to observe the result, which clearly showed two different rates of price 
appreciation in the same market: steady growth vs. rapid growth.  During the study timeframe,  
the overall real estate market in South Lake Tahoe has been on an upward trend and clearly 
profitable, an increase of 7.57% a year until 2006.  Certainly, it would have been a sagacious 
investment, if anyone had purchased a house in this market during 1990s and sold it before 2006 
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  Figure 3.2 Price Index: Nominal vs. Real (inflation adjusted) 
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4.0 Supply and Demand 
In order to predict the future prices and study their behaviors, a thorough study of supply and 
demand must be performed to identify determinants that strongly influence the prices in this 
market.  As one understands this relationship, one can make sound forecasts about the future 
behaviors of these determinants as well as how they impact the future prices.  Supply is usually 
measured by the amount of new residential construction.  However, we collected annual building 
permits to represent supply market, which is limited to houses within South Lake Tahoe, 
reasoning that if a building permit is issued for residential construction in certain year, this 
permit will lead to a new construction for that year.  Demand is measured by Tahoe skier visits 
based on an assumption that, as more people come to Tahoe for skiing, there will be a higher 
demand for housing. 
 
Supply and demand is a fundamental economic principle in which a unit price is either positively 
or negatively affected by the availability of the product.  Consequently, if there is a high demand 
for a product with low supply, the deficit of product will cause the price to rise.  Similarly, low 
demand with high supply in a product will result in decrease in price.  
 
This principle of supply and demand is applied to the real estate market, and explains how the 
housing prices are set to the price equilibrium.  Although the real estate market is considered to 
be one of the most stable industries in the US with a strong growth tendency, as highlighted in 
monotonic increase in national housing prices in every single year since World War II, certain 
events will influence the supply and demand in the national as well as the local real estate 
markets.  
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During a period of low stock availability as well as high demand, the home prices will soar.  This 
is particularly seen if we compare the asking prices of homes to a time when local real estate 
market conditions have high supply of homes for sale but low demand of people who want to 
live in this area.  However, one cannot fill a real estate supply shortage by immediate 
manufacturing of identical units.  This is not only a matter of replicating the stock, but also the 
time required in the process.  It is not a manufactured commodity.  Though one might be able to 
create more condos in a given space, the space itself is unique and cannot grow to accommodate 
a shortage of supply.  Therefore, the different points of supply and demand in an area will have a 
great influence on prices.  
 
4.1 Supply 
Measured by the total housing stock, supply is typically one of the most important factors to 
determine real estate prices.  In order to see how the availability of housing stock plays a role in 
the pricing, annual building permit data of South Lake Tahoe was gathered.  The annual building 
permit data will be measured as annual new construction occurrence.  Available only for the 
period after 1988, the annual permit data was obtained through El Dorado County’s Building 
Department.  Utilizing this annual permit data, coupled with the current stock figure, we 
computed how many stocks were existed in each year during the timeframe of this study.  
 
To help readers understand how the real estate cycle works, a brief explanation follows.  
Conventionally, a new housing stock is mostly created when residential prices exceeds the cost 
of new construction by a considerable amount, giving incentives to the developers to build new 
homes.  Once developers recognize that there is an opportunity, new construction boom will 
ensue, building which an excessive amount of housing units are built, which will be more than 
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enough for the demand of buyers.  This will cause the housing prices to fall.  As the prices fall, 
fewer developments will follow, eventually causing the prices to trend upward again.    
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  Figure 4.1 Historical building permits issued each year vs. total stock 
 
The Figure 4.1 reveals an important characteristic about the market, distinguished from the 
newly developed resort market.  First, one would find that the real estate market in South Lake 
Tahoe is a relatively mature market compare to other ski resorts.  Having its first residential 
development that dates to the late 19th century, this market continued to expand and already had 
a significant amount of housing stock in the late 1980s.  During this period, other ski resort areas 
were being discovered and recognized by vacationers.  Therefore, new constructions proceeded 
after 1988 accounted for 15 percent of the total stock, a relatively small portion.   
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Real Price Index vs Annual Building Permit
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  Figure 4.2  
 
 
In Figure 4.2, the real price index shows that the prices escalated from $70.62/SF in 1988 to 
$179.97/SF in 2008, approximately a155 percent increase in 20 years.  Comparing real prices 
and annual building permit, there are a few interesting points that can be observed.  In 1991, 
there was a sudden spike in construction, but strangely enough, it did not have any impact on 
prices.  From 2000 to 2003, as the price increased, the number of new permits (new construction) 
also increased.  An increase in stock provides buyers a greater range of options to purchase a 
house, which seemingly should cause the price of real estate price to drop.  However, the graph 
shows that this is not the case.  As mentioned previously, a 75 percent of total stock today was 
already built prior to 1988.  Since the number of new permits issued after 1988, regardless of 
changes in price, is relatively small, their influences on prices are in fact negligible.  However, 
newly developed ski resorts, located on the other side of the continent, tell a different story.  
Unlike Heavenly, Loon Mountain Ski Resort, New Hampshire had its first condo development 
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begin in the late 1970s and had approximately 2,100 condos by 2005.  What is interesting for this 
market is that supply responded very promptly and sensitively to the changes in price.  As prices 
escalated above construction costs, new constructions immediately followed, leading to a 
development boom.  This caused a rapid increase in the housing stock, since there was not much 
existing stock to begin with.  In turn, it led to an oversupply of housing units and depressed these 
prices back to pre-boom level.  Thus, often fluctuated by demand shocks, condo prices in Loon 
Mountain have remained flat over the years.11   
 
4.2 Annual Permit Equation 
Taking the historical permit information as a dependent variable, a series of regression was 
performed to determine other economic variables that had a significant effect on annual 
residential permit.  By analyzing the results of the regression, one with the most reasonable result 
and with correct signs was selected.  Based on this result, a stock equation is created to predict 
the amount of future stock by applying future assumptions of these independent variables.  As 
the dependant variable, the annual residential permit t is highly dependent on the following 
variables: number of permit t-1, real price index t-2, and current interest rate t.  Using coefficient of 
these independent variables, the following equation is created. 
 
 
Permits t = 78.6417 – [ 0.1431 x Permit t-1] + [ 0.6992 x Real Price Index t-2 ] 
          (112.2)                       (0.308)                           (0.311) 
 
- [ 0.7451 x Interest Rate t ] 
   (10.6) 
 
  Equation 4.1 
                                               
11
 William C. Wheaton, “Does Supply Prevent Appreciation?”, Journal of Real Estate Research. Vol.27. No.1.2005 
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In analyzing Equation 4.1 in detail, we point out that the elasticity with respect to permits is 
close to 1.0, measured by the percentage change in permits when prices double.  If prices 
increase by $200, permits will increase by 140, given by Equation 4.1.  However, if prices were 
permanently set at $400, doubled $200 increase, after 100 years they would have created 14,000 
more cumulative permits than they would without the price increase.  Since there are 
approximately 14,500 existing units in this region, it will take, at least, 100 years for the existing 
stock to double the amount.  Presumably, the building restrictions imposed by Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency are the cause of this delay between new construction and price increase, 
making further development more difficult and costly. 
 
Using the following equation, total stock is calculated using permit data. 
Stock t = Stock t-1 + Permits t-1 
 
 Equation 4.2 
 
As shown in the result of the regression in Table 4.1, the value of R square is .38, meaning 
almost 40 percent of new permit can be explained by these three variables.  This also indicates 
that the real price index t-2, with t-Stat of 2.25, is highly significant in determining the new permit. 
Since it refers to the price two years back, it captures the momentum in prices.  
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 New Permit Regression 
    
SUMMARY OUTPUT      
 
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.616862571     
R Square 0.380519432     
Adjusted R Square 0.247773596     
Standard Error 34.54942618     
Observations 18     
 
 
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 3 10264.99789 3421.665963 2.866526311 0.074251497 
Residual 14 16711.27989 1193.662849   
Total 17 26976.27778       
 
 
 
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 78.64174484 112.1912111 0.700961725 0.494813525 -161.9846853 
Permit t-1 -0.143094792 0.308002433 -0.464589812 0.649368036 -0.803694898 
Real Price Index t-2 0.69918286 0.311269375 2.246230808 0.041346653 0.031575854 
Interest rate
 t -0.74514594 10.603859 -0.070271204 0.944971716 -23.4881818 
      
      
      
   Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
   319.2681749 -161.984685 319.2681749 
   0.517505313 -0.8036949 0.517505313 
   1.366789866 0.031575854 1.366789866 
   21.99788992 -23.4881818 21.99788992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 4.1 
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4.3 Demand 
 
In the previous section, we studied supply and created a new permit equation to forecast the 
future supply.  In turn, we must also study demand, identifying different variables that affect 
skier visits.  According to a demographic research of home buyers, a majority of the buyers come 
from San Francisco Bay Area and the adjacent cities in Nevada12.  These buyers are either young 
professionals seeking for their vacation home or retirees searching for their retirement home.  
Many of them indicated that investment potential on investment was a key consideration when 
buying resort properties.  
 
4.3.1 Skier Visits 
 
Defined as one-person alpine skiing for one day, a skier visit is measured by ticket sales, in 
which one ticket sold is equivalent to one skier.  Heavenly Resort skier visits data prior to 2002 
was not available to the general public until the resort became a public company in 2002. 
Therefore, statewide and region-wide data will be used.  For the study of demand, data on 
California skier visits and Tahoe area skier visits was gathered and sourced through the 
California Ski Industry Association, which tracks the skier visits data measured by ticket sales 
from the 1979 season to the present.  Both of these series are helpful to compare trends, but only 
Tahoe skier visits data are used for the analysis. 
 
Even though the number of skier visits for both CA and Tahoe has fluctuated during the studied 
period, one can conclude that the overall skier visits remained relatively steady for Tahoe area, 
from 3.7 million in 1987-1988 season to 4.1 million in 2007-2008.  A similar trend is shown for 
California.  From 1988 to 1991 season, a steep decreasing trend is observed, a 40% drop from 
                                               
12
 Alec Rosenberg  “Investors fuel second-home boom”, Oakland Tribune, Apr.1, 2005 
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  Figure 4.3 
 
3.7 to 2.3 million, followed by a steady increase until 2005 – 2006 season.  It showed a 125% 
increase in skier visits from 2.3 million in 1990-1991 season to 5.1 in 2005-2006 season.   
 
These fluctuations of skier visits are influenced predominately by the regional economy, 
measured by growth in income and employment, natural snowfall, as well as the previous year's 
skier turnout.  Figure 4.4 underscores the link between skier visits and snowfall.  For example, 
snowfalls in 1993 and 1995 were 344.0 and 455.5 inches respectively, which are all time highs 
during the study of our timeframe.  As can be guessed, skier visits increased during those years 
of phenomenal snowfall. 
 
Consisted of 14 ski resorts, Tahoe ski areas are attracting millions of people each year from all 
over the world.  Most of these visitors do come from the San Francisco Bay Area, only a 3 hour- 
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driving distance.  Therefore, it makes sense to use regional economic factors for the study of 
demand in order to predict future skier visits in the econometric model.   
 
Snowfall vs Skier Visits
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Sn
o
w
fa
ll,
 
in
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
Sk
ie
r 
Vi
si
ts
, 
m
ill
io
n
Tahoe Skier Visits Avg. Snowfall
 
  Figure 4.4 
 
4.3.2  Snowfall 
Measured in inches, snowfall was obtained directly from the marketing department of Heavenly 
Ski Resort.  It is measured by a several stations throughout the resort.  The amount of snowfall is 
figured by the ski season, from November to April, to better match the skier visit counts.  From 
Figure 4.4, it is clear that the amount of snowfall each season fluctuates considerably throughout 
the studied period.  Comparing to the Skier Visits to the amount of snowfall clearly shows a 
noticeable result.  They are highly correlated.  As Snowfall increase in certain year, more skier 
visits will follow.   
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  Figure 4.5 
 
4.3.3 San Francisco Bay Area Income 
Per capita income for San Francisco Bay Area is another important economic factor that 
influences skier visits.  Measured in dollars, income data was collected through California 
government agency, Employment Development Department.  The Employment Development 
Department tracts economic data related to the labor market for California and its counties. 
Consisted of 9 individual counties, San Francisco Bay Area has one of the highest Per Capita 
Incomes in the U.S.  Since this data is not achievable for San Francisco Bay Area, Per Capita 
Income for those 9 counties were gathered and averaged to arrive at the San Francisco Bay Area 
Income. 
 
 
 
 33 
4.4  Skier Visits Equation  
In determining which variables had a significant affect on demand, many other data sets were 
regressed against Skier Visits.  Analyzing these regression results, the only combination with 
variables that affect skier visits and with a reasonable R square was selected, as shown in Table 
4.2.   
 
Skier Visits Regression                                  
    
SUMMARY OUTPUT      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.877502615     
R Square 0.77001084     
Adjusted R Square 0.699244944     
Standard Error 0.371262064     
Observations 18     
 
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 5.999209 1.499802184 10.88110076 0.000426203 
Residual 13 1.791862 0.13783552   
Total 17 7.791071       
 
 
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 0.720175397 1.812699 0.397294544 0.697596417 -3.195921806 
Skier Visits t-1 -0.019889009 0.227445 -0.087445433 0.931650093 -0.511253529 
Snowfall t 0.002813974 0.000953 2.953317809 0.011200221 0.000755537 
Bay Area Employment t 2.70523E-07 7.07E-07 0.382475676 0.708288603 -1.2575E-06 
Bay Area Income t 4.12497E-05 1.7E-05 2.422173651 0.030779437 4.45856E-06 
      
      
   Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
   4.6362726 -3.19592181 4.6362726 
   0.471475511 -0.51125353 0.471475511 
   0.004872412 0.00075553 0.004872412 
   1.79854E-06 -1.2575E-06 1.79854E-06 
   7.80409E-05 4.45856E-06 7.80409E-05 
      
 
 Table 4.2 
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For the purpose of forecasting future demand, the following equation was constructed, taking 
Tahoe skier visits as the dependent variable.  More independent variables could have been added 
for a complex analysis.  However, one with the fewer the inputs is selected.  Because we need to 
make fewer assumptions when determining the future skier visits. 
 
Skier Visits t = 0.7202 – [ 0.0199 x Skier Visits t-1] + [ 0.0028 x Snowfall t ] 
                  (1.813)                    (0.227)                                     (0.0010) 
 
+ [ 2.7052E-07 x SF BA Employment t ] + [ 4.1250E-0.5 x BA Income t ] 
                      (7.07 E-07)                                                   (1.7 E-05) 
 
 Equation 4.3 
 
 
With these four variables - previous year’s visits, natural snowfall, San Francisco Bay Area 
employment, and income - R square of .77 was achieved, meaning 77 percent of the variations in 
skier visits are explained by this model.  All these inputs would arguably affect skier visits.  
Examining the t-Stats for each variable, one can identify that t-Stat for snowfall and income 
showed a much higher value.  In another words, the effect of these contributions of these two 
variables in affecting skier visits is more significant than the other variables: previous year’s 
visits and San Francisco Bay Area employment.  Also, the previous year’s visits in the equation 
does not accounts for the momentum factor.  Skiers for the last year are less likely to be those of 
this year.  In conclusion, as income grows or more snowfall comes in a certain year, it is 
expected that skier visits will also increase for that year.  
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5.0 The Real Price Equation 
Using the key economic variables, the real price equation is created.  This price equation enables 
us to forecast the future prices and their behaviors.  As in the previous chapters (when creating 
supply and demand equations), similar approach was taken in determining other economic 
variables that strongly influence the real pricing.  Different sets of variable combination were 
first gathered and regressed against the real price index.  Besides exhibiting the highest R square, 
the ideal pricing equation would be one that utilizes the fewest independent variables.  After 
running numerous regressions, a set that utilizes the following variables - previous real price, 
Tahoe visits, interest rates, Bay Area income and stock - was chosen.  With R square of .91, this 
model explains 91 percent of the pricing scenarios.  Also, coefficient of these variables expresses 
the most appropriate sign that follows a fundamental supply and demand principle.  
 
  Real Price Index t = 884.8 + [ 0.8311 x Real Price Index t-1] - [ 0.07224 x Stock t ] 
                         (790.1)                    (0.1765)                                      (0.06439) 
 
+ [ 10.0343 x Skier Visits
 t ] - [ 11.2276 x Interest Rate t ] 
                                                (8.568)                                 (8.945) 
 
+[ 0.003135 x BA Income t ] 
             (0.0025) 
 
  Equation 5.1 
 
Again, all these inputs would affect real prices index.  However, comparing t-Stats of each 
variable, the previous year’s prices, with the highest t-Stat of 4.7, can be further said that it has a 
significant influence in determining the pricing behaviors due to a momentum effect. 
Additionally, it is found that the previous year’s price index, Tahoe visits, and income have 
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positive correlations with real price index.  The real price index will increase or decrease as one 
of these variables increases or decreases in value.   
 
Real Price Index Regression 
    
SUMMARY OUTPUT      
 
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.956460588     
R Square 0.914816856     
Adjusted R Square 0.882054109     
Standard Error 15.30843948     
Observations 19     
 
 
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 5 32717.92028 6543.584056 27.92247058 1.61105E-06 
Residual 13 3046.528153 234.3483195   
Total 18 35764.44843       
 
 
 
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 884.7846601 790.1271133 1.119800403 0.283061694 -822.180861 
Price t -1 0.831136218 0.176530231 4.708180653 0.000409131 0.449765914 
Tahoe Visits t 10.03430402 8.568452515 1.171075407 0.262586923 -8.476708659 
Interest Rate t  -11.22764986 8.945317567 -1.255142679 0.2315212 -30.55282982 
Bay Area Income t 0.003135203 0.002519525 1.244362573 0.235334508 -0.002307899 
Stock t -0.072242445 0.064393271 -1.121894324 0.282202458 -0.211355621 
      
      
      
   Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
   2591.750181 -822.180861 2591.750181 
   1.212506522 0.449765914 1.212506522 
   28.5453167 -8.47670866 28.5453167 
   8.097530111 -30.5528298 8.097530111 
   0.008578304 -0.0023079 0.008578304 
   0.066870732 -0.21135562 0.066870732 
      
 
 
  Table 5.1 
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From the demand equation, we examined that snowfall and income are more directly related to 
skier visits than the previous year’s price is.  If these two variables increase, there will lead to a 
higher demand for housing.  As a result, the real price will rise.  Negatively correlated to the real 
price index, however, the current year’s stock and interest rate worked exactly in an opposite 
manner.  Either one of current stock or interest rate increases in value, it will cause the real price 
to drop.  As the mortgage interest rate rises, money becomes more expensive to borrow, causing 
housing demand to lower.  Eventually, the real price will fall to a point where the price cannot be 
supported by demand at that time.   
 
Using a system of equations, coupled with a new stock equation that connects all the equations, 
the future pricing behaviors will be examined.  The following diagram will help readers 
understand the relationships between these four equations that form the econometric model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 5.1 
 
Permits t = 78.6417 – [ 0.1431 x Permit t-1] + [ 0.6992 x Real Price Index t-2 ] 
                - [ 0.7451 x Interest Rate t ] 
 
Skier Visits t = 0.7202 – [ 0.0199 x Skier Visits t-1] + [ 0.0028 x Snowfall t ] 
                + [ 2.7052E-07 x BA Employment t ] + [ 4.1250E-0.5 x BA Income t ] 
 
Real Price Index t = 884.8 + [ 0.8311 x Real Price Index t-1] - [ 0.07224 x Stock t] 
                              + [ 10.0343 x Skier Visits
 t ] - [ 11.2276 x Interest Rate t ] 
                              + [ 0.003135 x BA Income t ] 
 
Stock t = Stock t-1 + Permits t-1 
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6.0 Future Pricing Model 
Using the newly created set of equations, the future pricing and its behaviors will be studied.  
This study is divided into to 3 scenarios: realistic, optimistic, and pessimistic.  Since these 
equations are derived from snowfall, interest rates, employment, and income, these variables 
need to be reasonably assumed for each scenario.   
 
6.1 Realistic Scenario 
 
Year Real Price Total  Annual Skier Visits Snowfall Employment Bay Area Income Bay Area  Interest 
  Index Stock Permits (millions) (in) Growth Employment Growth Income($) Rates(%) 
Average  
88-08 $112.65 12,981 108.7 3.9 244.8 0.4% 3,183,455 5.0% 38,204 7.61 
Forecast 
09-19         244.8 0.4% - 5.0% - 7 to 6 
1988 $70.62 12,096 46 3.7 108.5 - - - 23,460 10.34 
1989 $66.44 12,142 29 3.9 200.0 - - 5.9% 24,853 10.32 
1990 $74.13 12,171 70 3.5 114.0 - 3,029,207 5.4% 26,203 10.13 
1991 $77.86 12,241 170 2.3 147.0 -2.9% 2,942,366 1.9% 26,698 9.25 
1992 $71.17 12,411 87 2.9 122.5 -1.9% 2,887,645 4.6% 27,922 8.39 
1993 $78.86 12,498 115 3.5 344.0 -0.3% 2,879,500 1.9% 28,462 7.31 
1994 $71.94 12,613 109 3.4 152.0 0.7% 2,900,397 3.4% 29,421 8.38 
1995 $77.48 12,722 94 4.1 455.5 2.2% 2,964,060 5.8% 31,122 7.93 
1996 $70.26 12,816 117 3.2 281.5 3.9% 3,078,411 6.3% 33,086 7.81 
1997 $70.19 12,933 91 3.4 277.0 3.4% 3,182,397 5.7% 34,980 7.60 
1998 $77.73 13,024 94 4.4 309.5 3.8% 3,303,428 8.4% 37,908 6.94 
1999 $68.74 13,118 81 4.4 354.8 2.7% 3,391,396 8.2% 41,016 7.44 
2000 $104.78 13,199 90 4.0 220.5 4.5% 3,545,274 14.1% 46,806 8.05 
2001 $117.79 13,289 98 4.1 186.0 -1.7% 3,484,810 -1.5% 46,121 6.97 
2002 $139.90 13,387 120 4.1 229.5 -4.9% 3,312,546 -2.7% 44,867 6.54 
2003 $166.93 13,507 168 4.1 185.3 -3.0% 3,213,125 1.2% 45,410 5.83 
2004 $173.89 13,675 139 4.4 232.5 -0.7% 3,191,936 7.3% 48,708 5.84 
2005 $203.94 13,814 114 4.6 368.0 0.7% 3,213,983 7.8% 52,497 5.87 
2006 $224.91 13,928 108 5.1 374.5 1.9% 3,275,561 6.4% 55,876 6.41 
2007 $178.15 14,036 234 4.2 200.0 6.3% 3,482,800 5.0% 58,669 6.34 
2008 $179.96 14,270 165 4.1 277.5 -7.9% 3,206,800 5.0% 61,603 6.22 
2009 $166.20 14,435 166 5.0 244.8 0.4% 3,219,627 5.0% 64,683 7.00 
2010 $157.30 14,601 166 5.2 244.8 0.4% 3,232,506 5.0% 67,917 6.75 
2011 $150.01 14,767 160 5.3 244.8 0.4% 3,245,436 5.0% 71,313 6.75 
2012 $147.92 14,927 155 5.5 244.8 0.4% 3,258,417 5.0% 74,879 6.50 
2013 $148.36 15,082 154 5.6 244.8 0.4% 3,271,451 5.0% 78,623 6.50 
2014 $151.59 15,236 155 5.8 244.8 0.4% 3,284,537 5.0% 82,554 6.50 
2015 $160.57 15,392 158 6.0 244.8 0.4% 3,297,675 5.0% 86,681 6.25 
2016 $172.09 15,549 164 6.2 244.8 0.4% 3,310,866 5.0% 91,015 6.25 
2017 $186.03 15,713 172 6.4 244.8 0.4% 3,324,109 5.0% 95,566 6.25 
2018 $205.06 15,885 181 6.6 244.8 0.4% 3,337,406 5.0% 100,344 6.00 
2019 $225.70 16,066 193 6.8 244.8 0.4% 3,350,755 5.0% 105,362 6.00 
 
Table 6.1 
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The first case portrays a realistic scenario.  What happens to the future economy usually mirrors 
what has happened in the past, as history tends to repeat itself.  In this case, instead of using 
cyclical trends, we compute the historical growth rate of each variable (linear trend) and used it 
as a basis to estimate future growth rates for the next 10 years.  For instance, the average 
employment growth rate from 1990 to 2008 was .4 percent per year.  We assume, then, that the 
annual employment growth rate for next ten years will be .4 percent.  Applying this growth rate, 
we are able to calculate the future employments.  The same method is used to forecast the future 
income.  For snowfall, however, it is very difficult to recognize any notable trends.  For the sake 
of simplicity, a historical average of 244.8 inches of snowfall is used for the next ten years (note: 
this is not an annual growth rate).  Lastly, based on Mortgage Bankers Association’s economy 
forecasts, we assume that the interest rate goes up to 7.0 percent in 2009 and gradually falls back 
to 6.0 percent in 2019.  This interest rate assumption will be applied in all cases.  
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  Figure 6.1 
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In chapter 4, we examined that Tahoe skier visits are dependent on snowfall, employment, and 
income and the previous year’s skier visits.  Due to a steady growth in income and 
employment, .4 percent and 5 percent respectively, and a moderate snowfall of 244.8 inches, 
skier visits immediately jump a remarkable 23 percent in the 2009 ski season.  Though slower, 
the increase begins to follow a linear trend of 3 percent a year until 2019.  
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  Figure 6.2 
 
New permits are more closely linked to interest rates, the previous year’s real price (price t-2) and 
permits (permits t-1) than the current economic conditions.  Higher interest rates and a decline in 
price cause stagnation in annual permits for the next two years.  Thereafter, an immediate 
downward trend is observed until 2013, falling at a rate of 1.3 percent a year.  As interest rates 
decline, the new permits slowly begin to increase at 4 percent annually, from 154 permits in 
2009 to 193 in 2013.  A similar trend is observed in the real price index.  In response to modest 
snowfall and economic growth, the real prices immediately start to fall 4 percent a year until 
2013.  Thereafter, it exhibits an upward trend until 2019.  
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  Figure 6.3 
 
6.2 Optimistic Scenario 
Year Real Price Total  Annual Skier Visits Snowfall Employment Bay Area Income Bay Area  Interest 
  Index Stock Permits (millions) (in)l Growth Employment Growth Income($) Rates(%) 
Average  
88'-08' $112.65 12,981 108.7 3.9 244.8 0.4% 3,183,455 5.0% 38,204 7.61 
Forecast 
09'-19'         375.0 1.5%   7.0%   7 to 6 
                      
2009 $178.80 14,435 166 5.5 375.0 1.5% 3,254,902 7.0% 67,171 7.00 
2010 $185.77 14,601 175 5.7 375.0 1.5% 3,303,726 7.0% 71,872 6.75 
2011 $196.96 14,776 180 6.0 375.0 1.5% 3,353,281 7.0% 76,904 6.75 
2012 $215.36 14,956 186 6.2 375.0 1.5% 3,403,581 7.0% 82,287 6.50 
2013 $237.82 15,142 199 6.5 375.0 1.5% 3,454,634 7.0% 88,047 6.50 
2014 $264.20 15,341 213 6.7 375.0 1.5% 3,506,454 7.0% 94,210 6.50 
2015 $297.12 15,554 230 7.0 375.0 1.5% 3,559,051 7.0% 100,805 6.25 
2016 $333.09 15,784 251 7.3 375.0 1.5% 3,612,436 7.0% 107,861 6.25 
2017 $371.84 16,036 274 7.7 375.0 1.5% 3,666,623 7.0% 115,411 6.25 
2018 $415.96 16,310 298 8.0 375.0 1.5% 3,721,622 7.0% 123,490 6.00 
2,019 $461.99 16,608 326 8.4 375.0 1.5% 3,777,447 7.0% 132,135 6.00 
 
 Table 6.2 
 
With much higher income and employment growth rates as well as a phenomenal snowfall, the 
optimistic case represents the most attractive price appreciation, more skier visits, and new 
permits increase.  For this scenario, we assume 1.5 percent for the employment growth rate and 7 
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percent for income because economy growth for this case should portray the economic condition 
between 2003 and 2006, a period with strong economy growth. 
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  Figure 6.4 
 
In reaction to 375 inches of snowfall (vs. 244.8 in), 7 percent of annual income growth (vs. 5%), 
and 1.5 percent employment growth (vs. 0.4%), the number of skier visits increases 34 percent 
during 2008- 2009 season and plateau out to a 4 percent annual increase thereafter.  Interestingly, 
its annual growth rate of 7 percent precisely matches the income growth.  Therefore, a change in 
income is a significant factor that influences skier visits.  Accordingly, new permits also grow at 
a rate of 6.5 percent, compared to 1.5 percent in the realistic scenario, annually for the next 10 
years.  As a result of these increases, the real prices will also escalate a terrific 9 percent annually, 
from $178.8 in 2009 to $462 in 2019.  However, it is surprising to see that the amount of total 
stock does not respond fast enough to this optimistic economy growth.  Despite the fact that new 
permits steadily increase at a rate of 6.5 percent, their contributions, regardless of economic 
conditions, to the total stock is insignificant.  Possibly, restrictions on new development imposed 
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by Tahoe Regional Planning Agency may explain why a relatively small number of new 
constructions are permitted each year.  Hence, in order for real prices to taper off due to a 
sufficient supply of cumulative housing units in this market, it will probably take several decades 
at least.  
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  Figure 6.5 
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  Figure 6.6 
 44 
6.3 Pessimistic Scenario  
Year Real Price Total  Annual Skier Visits Snowfall Employment Bay Area Income Bay Area  Interest 
  Index Stock Permits (millions)  (in) Growth Employment Growth Income($) Rates(%) 
Average 
88-08 $112.65 12,981 109 3.9 244.8 0.4% 3,183,455 5.0% 38,204 7.61 
Forecast 
09-19         200.0 0.2%   3.5%   7 to 6 
2009 $158.41 14,435 166 4.8 200.0 0.2% 3,213,214 3.5% 62,848 7.00 
2010 $139.29 14,601 161 4.9 200.0 0.2% 3,219,640 3.5% 65,048 6.75 
2011 $119.91 14,762 147 5.0 200.0 0.2% 3,226,079 3.5% 67,324 6.75 
2012 $104.37 14,909 135 5.1 200.0 0.2% 3,232,531 3.5% 69,681 6.50 
2013 $90.42 15,044 126 5.2 200.0 0.2% 3,238,997 3.5% 72,120 6.50 
2014 $78.75 15,169 118 5.3 200.0 0.2% 3,245,475 3.5% 74,644 6.50 
2015 $72.65 15,287 111 5.5 200.0 0.2% 3,251,965 3.5% 77,256 6.25 
2016 $69.20 15,398 108 5.6 200.0 0.2% 3,258,469 3.5% 79,960 6.25 
2017 $68.51 15,506 106 5.7 200.0 0.2% 3,264,986 3.5% 82,759 6.25 
2018 $73.37 15,612 107 5.8 200.0 0.2% 3,271,516 3.5% 85,655 6.00 
2019 $80.39 15,719 110 5.9 200.0 0.2% 3,278,059 3.5% 88,653 6.00 
 
 Table 6.3 
 
As can be seen Table 6.3, there is the greatest price decline in the pessimistic scenario.  For this 
case, we assume 200 inches of snowfall, .2 percent employment growth, and 3.5 percent of 
income growth to replicate the economic condition under the early 1990’s U.S. recession.  
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  Figure 6.7 
 
In reaction to the growth rates that are below historical averages, the number of skier visits 
grows only at 3 percent a year, compared to 7% in the optimistic case.  Again, this growth rate 
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keeps up with the income growth.  In spite of the weak economic growth, annual permits 
surprisingly manage to remain unchanged in the following year and begin their downward trend, 
from 166 permits in 2009 to 110 in 2019.  Finally, the decrease in the real price is remarkable, 
from $158.41 in 2009 to $80.39 in 2019.  This is more than a 45 percent decline.   
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  Figure 6.8 
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  Figure 6.9 
 46 
7.0 Conclusion 
 
The intent of this study was to understand the second home market near Heavenly Ski Resort and 
to predict its future pricing behaviors.  In order to do this study, we constructed a series of 
econometric models by analyzing a large amount of historical economic, demographic, and 
climate data pertaining to the Heavenly Ski Resort market.  Utilizing these econometric models, 
we examined the future pricing behaviors in terms of three different market conditions: realistic, 
optimistic and pessimistic.      
 
There are several findings throughout the historical data analysis.  Firstly, we found that this 
market has experienced a significant amount of real price appreciation during the 20 years of the 
study period, from $70.62 in 1988 to $179.96 in 2008.  This price appreciation is closely linked 
to economic growth and mainly caused by the low mortgage interest rates, the liberal mortgage 
lending practices, and an increase in demand for second homes.  Though skier visits often 
fluctuated, they appear to have increased slightly during the same period.  Lastly, increases in 
new permits were observed during most of the 20 year period under study, and it is noted that the 
momentum effect in price plays a big role in determining the new permit.     
 
In the study of future pricing behaviors with three different scenarios, the following pricing 
behaviors were observed.  First, in the realistic case with a modest snowfall and economy growth, 
the real price immediately showed a downward trend until 2013, when it began upward trend, 
from $147.92 in 2013 to $225.70 in 2019.  Secondly, the phenomenal price appreciation in the 
optimistic scenario was mainly caused by strong economic growth and outstanding natural 
snowfall.  The price escalated from $178.80 in 2009 to $461.99 in 2019, a roughly 158% 
increase.  On the other hand, the greatest price decline was observed in the pessimistic scenario. 
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In fact, the real price decreased from $158.41 in 2009 to $80.39 in 2019, a more than 45 percent 
decline in price.  In conclusion, the real housing prices will likely continue to rise in realistic and 
optimistic scenarios, but not in pessimistic scenarios.   
 
In 2005, an article that examined ski condo prices for New England was published in Journal of 
Real Estate Research.  According to this article, “the historical movements in condo prices and 
stock behave as if supply were perfectly elastic in real price levels and prone to overbuild every 
time positive demand shock occurs.”13  This means that new construction will promptly follow, 
as condo prices begin to appreciate above construction cost, rapidly depressing prices. The main 
reason for the dynamic price behaviors is that, unlike the real estate market near Heavenly, this 
market is relatively young, with its first condo development in 1976, and apparently has fewer 
development restrictions permitting new condo supply.  In contrast, South Lake Tahoe has a 
major portion of housing stock built prior to 1980, and subsequent constructions were relatively 
minimal.  Hence, the total stock has not increased considerably to influence real prices for the 
last 20 years.  Based on our analysis, it takes several decades, at least, to build considerable 
housing stock to affect real prices.  The development restrictions imposed by Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency may explain the small number of development occurrences.  With more 
confined housing supply, prices in South Lake Tahoe have appreciated 155 percent in real terms, 
while prices have fallen by 40% in New England over the last two decades.  
 
 
 
                                               
13
 William C. Wheaton, “Does Supply Prevent Appreciation?”, Journal of Real Estate Research. Vol.27. No.1.2005 
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Appendix A 
    Heavenly Ski Resort Sales Data 
 
APN Sale Date Price P/sf Baths Beds SqFt YearBuilt 
2503104 19881205 $85,000 79.74 1 3 1,066 1954 
2503116 19910130 $103,000 79.48 1 3 1,296 1959 
2503116 19990114 $20,000 15.43 1 3 1,296 1959 
2503119 20080327 $1,180,000 393.86 3.5 4 2,996 2006 
2503121 19970721 $130,000 130.78 1 2 994 1967 
2503228 20060801 $350,000 261.19 1 1 1,340 1952 
2503229 19880505 $190,000 78.64 4 4 2,416 1958 
2503229 19970109 $185,000 76.57 4 4 2,416 1958 
2503230 19880415 $99,000 47.60 2 4 2,080 1972 
2503230 19970106 $33,000 15.87 2 4 2,080 1972 
2503237 19960820 $99,000 134.88 1 2 734 1953 
2503237 20011109 $199,000 271.12 1 2 734 1953 
2503237 20030206 $250,000 340.60 1 2 734 1953 
2503238 19890217 $110,000 83.33 2 3 1,320 1965 
2503238 19950113 $160,500 121.59 2 3 1,320 1965 
2532103 20040806 $990,000 349.95 2.5 3 2,829 2004 
2532105 19890705 $140,500 98.25 2 3 1,430 1962 
2532105 19970521 $152,500 106.64 2 3 1,430 1962 
2532105 20031104 $421,000 294.41 2 3 1,430 1962 
2532107 19911216 $139,000 112.10 1 3 1,240 1974 
2532115 19930512 $158,000 91.01 3 3 1,736 1978 
2589101 19971110 $83,000 96.96 1.5 2 856 1972 
2589101 20050512 $355,000 414.72 1.5 2 856 1972 
2589102 19940331 $72,500 87.14 2 2 832 1972 
2589102 19980622 $78,000 93.75 2 2 832 1972 
2589102 20061109 $92,954 111.72 2 2 832 1972 
2589103 19990115 $80,000 96.15 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589103 20041110 $275,000 330.53 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589104 19891229 $74,000 86.45 2.5 2 856 1972 
2589104 19970805 $80,000 93.46 2.5 2 856 1972 
2589105 20011207 $155,000 176.34 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589106 19901102 $70,000 84.13 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589106 19990803 $87,000 104.57 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589106 20040831 $280,000 336.54 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589107 19890331 $25,000 30.05 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589107 19900330 $75,000 90.14 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589107 19900330 $67,000 80.53 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589107 19991118 $90,000 108.17 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589107 20010801 $145,000 174.28 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589107 20040611 $275,000 330.53 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589108 19920708 $66,000 79.33 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589108 20040611 $258,000 310.10 1.5 2 832 1972 
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2589108 20050119 $294,500 353.97 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589109 19930126 $69,000 82.93 2 2 832 1972 
2589109 20010420 $139,000 167.07 2 2 832 1972 
2589110 19990811 $72,500 82.48 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589110 20021226 $215,000 244.60 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589110 20030811 $225,000 255.97 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589110 20050525 $365,000 415.24 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589110 20080109 $255,000 290.10 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589110 20080509 $310,000 352.67 1.5 2 879 1972 
2589111 20020321 $76,000 88.79 2 2 856 1972 
2589111 20050817 $312,000 364.49 2 2 856 1972 
2589112 19900910 $67,000 80.53 2 2 832 1972 
2589112 19900910 $67,000 80.53 2 2 832 1972 
2589113 19891108 $62,000 74.52 2 2 832 1972 
2589113 19941007 $68,500 82.33 2 2 832 1972 
2589113 20031114 $217,000 260.82 2 2 832 1972 
2589114 19990126 $78,000 93.75 2 2 832 1972 
2589115 19900608 $67,000 80.53 2 2 832 1972 
2589115 19930604 $77,500 93.15 2 2 832 1972 
2589116 20071228 $275,000 330.53 2 2 832 1972 
2589117 19990902 $86,000 103.37 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589117 20041229 $319,000 383.41 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589117 20070918 $280,000 336.54 1.5 2 832 1972 
2589119 19921105 $40,000 48.08 2 2 832 1972 
2589119 19941216 $79,000 94.95 2 2 832 1972 
2589119 19991028 $85,000 102.16 2 2 832 1972 
2589119 20051014 $320,000 384.62 2 2 832 1972 
2589119 20051220 $160,000 192.31 2 2 832 1972 
2589121 19890216 $59,500 71.51 2 2 832 1972 
2589121 20010308 $125,000 150.24 2 2 832 1972 
2589121 20040330 $225,000 270.43 2 2 832 1972 
2589121 20070621 $300,000 360.58 2 2 832 1972 
2589122 20051021 $346,000 404.21 2 2 856 1972 
2589123 19881116 $65,000 75.93 2.5 2 856 1972 
2589123 20050722 $375,000 438.08 2.5 2 856 1972 
2589125 19990528 $83,000 99.76 2 2 832 1972 
2589126 19891116 $74,000 88.94 2 2 832 1972 
2589126 19981020 $74,000 88.94 2 2 832 1972 
2589127 19900425 $62,500 75.12 2 2 832 1972 
2589127 19911031 $70,000 84.13 2 2 832 1972 
2589127 19920205 $70,000 84.13 2 2 832 1972 
2589128 19991216 $91,000 106.31 2.5 2 856 1972 
2589130 19980410 $80,000 96.15 2 2 832 1972 
2589130 19990621 $85,500 102.76 2 2 832 1972 
2589130 20051007 $337,000 405.05 2 2 832 1972 
2589131 19980716 $77,000 92.55 2 2 832 1972 
2589131 20030227 $210,000 252.40 2 2 832 1972 
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2589132 19990909 $89,000 106.97 2 2 832 1972 
2589132 20020731 $190,000 228.37 2 2 832 1972 
2589133 19941229 $74,000 88.94 2 2 832 1972 
2589134 19891031 $63,000 75.72 2 2 832 1972 
2589136 19940630 $70,000 81.78 2.5 2 856 1972 
2589136 19970523 $77,000 89.95 2.5 2 856 1972 
2590101 19970227 $66,000 82.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590101 19980323 $68,500 85.63 2 2 800 1973 
2590102 19900123 $62,000 77.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590102 19900928 $62,000 77.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590102 19940414 $69,000 86.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590102 20041208 $279,000 348.75 2 2 800 1973 
2590103 19921023 $44,600 55.75 2 2 800 1973 
2590104 20000310 $90,000 112.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590105 20000915 $117,500 146.88 2 2 800 1973 
2590106 19930226 $79,000 98.75 2 2 800 1973 
2590106 19981015 $80,000 100.00 2 2 800 1973 
2590106 20040714 $286,000 357.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590107 19960918 $65,500 81.88 2 2 800 1973 
2590107 20040109 $204,000 255.00 2 2 800 1973 
2590108 19990301 $75,500 94.38 2 2 800 1973 
2590108 20020715 $180,000 225.00 2 2 800 1973 
2590109 19990121 $70,000 87.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590109 20000106 $88,000 110.00 2 2 800 1973 
2590111 19991207 $81,000 101.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590112 19960116 $66,000 82.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590112 19981201 $66,000 82.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590112 20020827 $132,000 165.00 2 2 800 1973 
2590113 19980129 $81,000 101.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590114 19900221 $73,000 91.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590116 20060628 $347,500 434.38 2 2 800 1973 
2590117 19931119 $78,000 97.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590117 20001229 $125,000 156.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590117 20030710 $195,000 243.75 2 2 800 1973 
2590117 20051123 $350,000 437.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590118 20011231 $110,000 137.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590119 19901018 $73,000 91.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590119 20020502 $70,000 87.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590120 20041109 $273,000 341.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590121 19910628 $72,000 90.00 2 2 800 1973 
2590121 20000728 $102,000 127.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590121 20071019 $102,000 127.50 2 2 800 1973 
2590122 19911106 $57,000 71.25 2 2 800 1973 
2590122 19940607 $87,000 108.75 2 2 800 1973 
2590122 20030908 $228,500 285.63 2 2 800 1973 
2590122 20080312 $228,500 285.63 2 2 800 1973 
2590123 19921214 $78,500 98.13 2 2 800 1973 
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2590123 19970728 $81,000 101.25 2 2 800 1973 
2804219 20040903 $205,000 213.54 1 3 960 1957 
2804219 20050602 $355,000 369.79 1 3 960 1957 
2805107 20060112 $497,500 485.84 1 2 1,024 1958 
2805110 20050805 $547,500 335.48 2.5 4 1,632 1967 
2805116 20050201 $730,000 303.16 3 4 2,408 1992 
2805119 20021209 $293,000 234.40 2 3 1,250 1973 
2805119 20030627 $329,000 263.20 2 3 1,250 1973 
2805119 20080125 $329,000 263.20 2 3 1,250 1973 
2805120 19900411 $57,000 40.20 2 4 1,418 1973 
2805121 19880803 $150,000 59.86 3 3 2,506 1965 
2805122 20020627 $427,000 144.26 4 4 2,960 1964 
2805122 20040903 $640,000 216.22 4 4 2,960 1964 
2805125 19951013 $210,000 95.80 2 3 2,192 1966 
2805203 19970707 $175,000 91.91 2.5 3 1,904 1969 
2805205 20041018 $460,000 286.07 2.5 3 1,608 1957 
2805206 19900731 $305,000 81.29 3 4 3,752 1958 
2805206 19991221 $315,000 83.96 3 4 3,752 1958 
2805206 20020923 $639,000 170.31 3 4 3,752 1958 
2805210 19971030 $209,000 100.10 2 3 2,088 1997 
2806103 19980616 $135,000 98.68 2 3 1,368 1973 
2806119 19910206 $207,500 85.04 2.5 3 2,440 1984 
2806120 19930903 $150,000 82.78 2 3 1,812 1959 
2806121 20000503 $390,000 121.65 2 4 3,206 1963 
2806125 20010919 $205,000 133.46 2 4 1,536 1975 
2806140 19990128 $175,000 105.68 2 2 1,656 1966 
2806140 20010323 $308,000 185.99 2 2 1,656 1966 
2806140 20041118 $429,000 259.06 2 2 1,656 1966 
2806142 19980923 $149,500 87.12 2 3 1,716 1974 
2806145 20080422 $125,000 70.22 2 3 1,780 1970 
2806201 19890915 $137,000 91.76 2 3 1,493 1962 
2806201 19931018 $155,000 103.82 2 3 1,493 1962 
2806201 20040412 $418,000 279.97 2 3 1,493 1962 
2806203 19931105 $142,000 92.27 2 3 1,539 1974 
2806206 19980710 $100,000 72.73 2 3 1,375 1957 
2806208 20020226 $302,500 207.76 2 3 1,456 1977 
2806301 20010208 $525,000 193.30 2.5 4 2,716 2001 
2806301 20020405 $700,000 257.73 2.5 4 2,716 2001 
2806301 20040315 $775,000 285.35 2.5 4 2,716 2001 
2806306 19941115 $78,500 54.63 1.5 3 1,437 1959 
2806307 19890216 $153,000 103.17 3.5 4 1,483 1963 
2806307 20050712 $1,255,000 846.26 3.5 4 1,483 1963 
2807013 19961002 $156,500 67.25 1.5 2 2,327 1963 
2807027 20050411 $1,250,000 386.88 4.5 5 3,231 2004 
2807027 20080423 $1,200,000 371.40 4.5 5 3,231 2004 
2808204 20021018 $425,000 241.48 3 4 1,760 1958 
2808205 20001219 $400,000 182.82 3 3 2,188 2000 
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2808205 20030923 $595,000 271.94 3 3 2,188 2000 
2808205 20060420 $865,000 395.34 3 3 2,188 2000 
2808208 19910530 $95,000 62.50 2 3 1,520 1957 
2812109 20010613 $195,000 156.25 2 3 1,248 1978 
2812132 20050418 $315,000 316.90 2 3 994 1952 
2812203 19970127 $92,000 102.22 1 2 900 1965 
2812301 20061108 $649,000 364.20 2.5 3 1,782 1976 
2812304 19890303 $171,500 65.11 3 5 2,634 1981 
2812305 19890308 $168,000 73.88 3 4 2,274 1975 
2812305 19901206 $189,000 83.11 3 4 2,274 1975 
2812305 19960229 $204,000 89.71 3 4 2,274 1975 
2812305 20031003 $620,000 272.65 3 4 2,274 1975 
2812308 20001006 $160,000 118.34 2 3 1,352 1964 
2812308 20021015 $370,000 273.67 2 3 1,352 1964 
2812308 20040505 $259,000 191.57 2 3 1,352 1964 
2812316 19970116 $158,000 124.12 2 3 1,273 1970 
2813102 20050527 $985,000 325.94 3.5 5 3,022 2005 
2813102 20070305 $1,195,000 395.43 3.5 5 3,022 2005 
2813106 20070216 $1,100,000 393.00 3 5 2,799 2006 
2813108 19880413 $29,000 23.75 2 3 1,221 1966 
2813108 19960221 $125,000 102.38 2 3 1,221 1966 
2813110 19941005 $135,000 96.15 2 4 1,404 1963 
2813112 19911030 $155,000 91.61 2 3 1,692 1970 
2813112 19981216 $196,500 116.13 2 3 1,692 1970 
2813112 20030402 $355,500 210.11 2 3 1,692 1970 
2813113 19890809 $85,500 74.22 2 3 1,152 1965 
2813114 19900627 $134,000 79.76 2 4 1,680 1972 
2813114 20010307 $260,000 154.76 2 4 1,680 1972 
2813114 20061208 $650,000 386.90 2 4 1,680 1972 
2813119 19881130 $105,000 90.36 2 3 1,162 1971 
2814122 19921102 $169,500 93.85 2 2 1,806 1980 
2814142 19930930 $185,000 124.58 2.5 2 1,485 1978 
2815101 20030922 $544,000 273.09 2 4 1,992 1975 
2815102 19941005 $300,000 191.69 2 3 1,565 1988 
2815102 20000616 $445,000 284.35 2 3 1,565 1988 
2815210 20070608 $630,000 368.42 2 3 1,710 1974 
2815211 20040329 $525,000 287.83 2 3 1,824 1977 
2815213 19930201 $225,000 129.31 2 3 1,740 1973 
2815213 20020426 $525,000 301.72 2 3 1,740 1973 
2815221 19890531 $155,000 87.37 2 3 1,774 1974 
2815221 19930423 $177,000 99.77 2 3 1,774 1974 
2815223 19941031 $255,000 140.34 3 4 1,817 1974 
2815224 19900511 $178,000 69.10 3 4 2,576 1978 
2815224 19901107 $178,000 69.10 3 4 2,576 1978 
2815224 19980225 $342,500 132.96 3 4 2,576 1978 
2815225 19940331 $197,000 148.34 2 2 1,328 1978 
2815243 19911218 $235,000 136.00 2 4 1,728 1974 
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2815243 19971114 $230,000 133.10 2 4 1,728 1974 
2815243 19971114 $215,000 124.42 2 4 1,728 1974 
2815246 20080303 $800,000 702.37 1.5 2 1,139 1965 
2815247 19880810 $525,000 108.05 3 4 4,859 1981 
2815247 20000531 $1,250,000 257.25 3 4 4,859 1981 
2815247 20060707 $2,350,000 483.64 3 4 4,859 1981 
2815248 19900601 $204,000 110.87 2.5 3 1,840 1968 
2815248 19980630 $213,000 115.76 2.5 3 1,840 1968 
2815310 19950922 $315,000 91.09 3.5 4 3,458 1977 
2815310 20000201 $599,000 173.22 3.5 4 3,458 1977 
2815310 20030213 $1,090,000 315.21 3.5 4 3,458 1977 
2815312 20000926 $540,000 247.25 2.5 3 2,184 1972 
2815314 20020816 $556,000 238.93 3 3 2,327 1969 
2815403 20071204 $845,000 346.88 3.5 5 2,436 1977 
2816101 20061214 $912,500 552.36 2 3 1,652 1979 
2816232 19900524 $375,000 125.50 3 4 2,988 1967 
2816233 19990903 $320,000 123.08 3 4 2,600 1976 
2816233 20001108 $485,000 186.54 3 4 2,600 1976 
2816233 20040116 $615,000 236.54 3 4 2,600 1976 
2816237 19980623 $470,000 132.10 3 4 3,558 1967 
2816237 19990517 $104,000 29.23 3 4 3,558 1967 
2816237 20000616 $770,000 216.41 3 4 3,558 1967 
2816303 19931217 $249,000 297.85 3 5 836 1972 
2816304 19891027 $265,000 87.78 3.5 4 3,019 1977 
2816304 19950719 $365,000 120.90 3.5 4 3,019 1977 
2816304 19970527 $416,000 137.79 3.5 4 3,019 1977 
2816304 19980930 $635,000 210.33 3.5 4 3,019 1977 
2816304 20020920 $1,120,000 370.98 3.5 4 3,019 1977 
2830102 19931015 $165,000 82.83 2 4 1,992 1977 
2830102 19971205 $176,500 88.60 2 4 1,992 1977 
2830102 19990708 $230,000 115.46 2 4 1,992 1977 
2830103 20010622 $326,000 176.41 2.5 3 1,848 1973 
2830104 20041018 $429,000 242.92 2 3 1,766 1973 
2830105 19880415 $150,000 81.17 2.5 3 1,848 1973 
2830109 19881102 $132,000 87.36 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2830110 19950929 $185,000 92.87 3 4 1,992 1977 
2830110 20021213 $472,500 237.20 3 4 1,992 1977 
2830111 19921001 $170,000 112.51 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2830111 19980213 $168,000 111.18 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2830112 19910412 $175,000 77.64 2 4 2,254 1979 
2830113 19880621 $114,000 62.23 2 2 1,832 1980 
2830113 20051117 $745,000 406.66 2 2 1,832 1980 
2830114 20070126 $595,000 394.56 2 2 1,508 1979 
2830115 20010921 $295,000 188.14 2 2 1,568 1977 
2830116 19900409 $160,000 84.21 2 2 1,900 1979 
2830116 19940531 $179,000 94.21 2 2 1,900 1979 
2830118 19900816 $177,000 97.90 2 2 1,808 1979 
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2830118 19950807 $177,000 97.90 2 2 1,808 1979 
2830118 19970822 $184,000 101.77 2 2 1,808 1979 
2830119 19931221 $59,500 39.46 2 2 1,508 1979 
2830119 19960812 $158,000 104.77 2 2 1,508 1979 
2830119 20050315 $550,000 364.72 2 2 1,508 1979 
2830120 20040514 $470,000 319.29 2 3 1,472 1973 
2830123 20011206 $339,000 230.30 2 3 1,472 1973 
2830124 19900503 $188,500 103.17 2 3 1,827 1973 
2830124 19980527 $230,000 125.89 2 3 1,827 1973 
2830125 19890223 $158,800 70.45 2 4 2,254 1979 
2830125 19940125 $225,000 99.82 2 4 2,254 1979 
2830125 19980109 $235,000 104.26 2 4 2,254 1979 
2830126 19900717 $227,500 101.56 3 3 2,240 1973 
2830126 19940420 $230,500 102.90 3 3 2,240 1973 
2830126 19980501 $254,000 113.39 3 3 2,240 1973 
2830126 20020814 $435,000 194.20 3 3 2,240 1973 
2830126 20021202 $485,000 216.52 3 3 2,240 1973 
2830127 19890912 $260,000 80.30 3 4 3,238 1973 
2830127 19930128 $310,000 95.74 3 4 3,238 1973 
2830127 19980527 $330,000 101.91 3 4 3,238 1973 
2830129 20021008 $380,000 190.76 2 4 1,992 1977 
2830132 19940810 $210,000 118.91 2 3 1,766 1973 
2830132 19970825 $232,500 131.65 2 3 1,766 1973 
2830137 19910603 $156,000 103.45 2 2 1,508 1980 
2830139 19970711 $122,000 54.13 2 4 2,254 1977 
2830140 19880816 $123,500 81.73 2 2 1,511 1980 
2830140 19940317 $145,500 96.29 2 2 1,511 1980 
2830140 20000411 $200,500 132.69 2 2 1,511 1980 
2830140 20010810 $287,000 189.94 2 2 1,511 1980 
2830141 19990322 $161,500 95.90 2 2 1,684 1979 
2830144 19961119 $190,000 84.29 2 4 2,254 1980 
2830145 19890331 $134,000 88.68 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2830145 20001018 $250,000 165.45 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2830145 20041028 $446,000 295.17 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2830146 19940930 $39,500 19.83 2 2 1,992 1979 
2830146 19990105 $199,000 99.90 2 2 1,992 1979 
2830146 20021108 $389,000 195.28 2 2 1,992 1979 
2830146 20041015 $535,000 268.57 2 2 1,992 1979 
2830147 19910110 $204,000 75.61 2.5 4 2,698 1973 
2830147 19930520 $276,500 102.48 2.5 4 2,698 1973 
2830147 19990301 $330,000 122.31 2.5 4 2,698 1973 
2830147 20031003 $535,000 198.30 2.5 4 2,698 1973 
2830148 19930209 $81,000 53.71 2 2 1,508 1980 
2830149 19910910 $174,500 104.30 2 2 1,673 1979 
2830149 19970923 $165,000 98.63 2 2 1,673 1979 
2830150 19900706 $175,000 99.09 2 3 1,766 1973 
2830150 20010205 $351,000 198.75 2 3 1,766 1973 
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2830150 20071031 $590,000 334.09 2 3 1,766 1973 
2830152 19970930 $177,000 120.24 2 3 1,472 1973 
2830152 20030703 $400,000 271.74 2 3 1,472 1973 
2830152 20050520 $590,000 400.82 2 3 1,472 1973 
2830153 19931124 $211,000 117.75 2 3 1,792 1973 
2830153 19990419 $232,500 129.74 2 3 1,792 1973 
2830154 19940413 $172,500 110.01 2 2 1,568 1980 
2830154 20020801 $356,000 227.04 2 2 1,568 1980 
2830154 20030625 $445,000 283.80 2 2 1,568 1980 
2830155 19931229 $200,000 111.61 2.5 3 1,792 1973 
2830155 19980820 $205,000 114.40 2.5 3 1,792 1973 
2830155 20071030 $521,000 290.74 2.5 3 1,792 1973 
2830156 19901018 $157,500 104.44 2 2 1,508 1980 
2830156 19920529 $165,500 109.75 2 2 1,508 1980 
2830157 19930406 $155,000 77.81 2 2 1,992 1980 
2830157 19960117 $182,000 91.37 2 2 1,992 1980 
2830157 20000821 $238,000 119.48 2 2 1,992 1980 
2830157 20020205 $333,500 167.42 2 2 1,992 1980 
2830157 20030630 $445,000 223.39 2 2 1,992 1980 
2830159 19940817 $400,000 155.95 2 3 2,565 1990 
2830159 19990219 $470,000 183.24 2 3 2,565 1990 
2830160 19940629 $240,000 51.98 5 5 4,617 1992 
2830161 19980911 $650,000 200.37 3 3 3,244 1991 
2830161 20000313 $795,000 245.07 3 3 3,244 1991 
2830161 20020722 $905,000 278.98 3 3 3,244 1991 
2830162 19971219 $560,000 124.44 3 5 4,500 1991 
2831101 19980128 $171,000 85.84 3 4 1,992 1977 
2831102 19890814 $12,000 5.32 2 4 2,254 1980 
2831105 19910906 $222,000 98.49 2 4 2,254 1979 
2831105 19980817 $235,000 104.26 2 4 2,254 1979 
2831106 19941122 $185,000 92.87 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831107 19951129 $205,500 91.17 2 4 2,254 1977 
2831108 19900831 $220,000 110.44 2 4 1,992 1977 
2831109 19931116 $101,000 66.84 1.5 3 1,511 1977 
2831109 19940428 $168,000 111.18 1.5 3 1,511 1977 
2831111 19901109 $32,000 14.20 2 4 2,254 1979 
2831111 19950209 $230,000 102.04 2 4 2,254 1979 
2831111 19970509 $225,000 99.82 2 4 2,254 1979 
2831112 19971126 $226,000 113.45 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831113 19910405 $157,500 104.24 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831113 19951025 $155,000 102.58 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831114 19980925 $148,500 100.47 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831114 20060825 $562,000 380.24 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831115 19910129 $182,000 91.37 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831115 19920514 $182,000 91.37 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831115 19970401 $175,000 87.85 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831116 19910206 $135,000 91.34 1.5 2 1,478 1977 
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2831116 19970929 $150,000 101.49 1.5 2 1,478 1977 
2831116 20010731 $306,818 207.59 1.5 2 1,478 1977 
2831118 20050823 $610,000 306.22 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831120 19890925 $130,000 86.04 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831120 19950929 $140,000 92.65 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831123 19900322 $135,000 89.34 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831123 19940107 $150,000 99.27 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831123 20041020 $105,000 69.49 1.5 2 1,511 1979 
2831124 19910718 $170,000 75.52 2 2 2,251 1979 
2831124 20010809 $330,000 146.60 2 2 2,251 1979 
2831126 20001010 $230,000 158.84 2.5 3 1,448 1977 
2831126 20020328 $319,000 220.30 2.5 3 1,448 1977 
2831126 20031003 $405,000 279.70 2.5 3 1,448 1977 
2831127 19951219 $151,000 100.13 2 2 1,508 1980 
2831127 20000208 $189,500 125.66 2 2 1,508 1980 
2831127 20020228 $290,000 192.31 2 2 1,508 1980 
2831128 19990608 $177,000 133.28 2 2 1,328 1979 
2831129 20040305 $530,000 235.45 2 2 2,251 1980 
2831130 19881227 $137,000 87.37 2 2 1,568 1980 
2831131 19951031 $181,000 113.13 1.5 2 1,600 1979 
2831133 19891122 $136,000 92.02 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831133 19940927 $150,000 101.49 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831133 19981106 $152,000 102.84 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831133 20041222 $460,000 311.23 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831134 19901114 $205,000 91.07 2 2 2,251 1979 
2831135 19891212 $142,000 94.16 2 2 1,508 1979 
2831135 19950531 $158,000 104.77 2 2 1,508 1979 
2831135 20041229 $400,000 265.25 2 2 1,508 1979 
2831136 19901002 $165,000 82.83 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831137 19891003 $124,000 83.90 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831137 19891003 $124,000 83.90 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831137 19990726 $167,000 112.99 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831138 19970813 $169,000 84.84 2 4 1,992 1977 
2831138 20010522 $319,000 160.14 2 4 1,992 1977 
2831139 19880826 $125,000 94.13 2 2 1,328 1979 
2831139 19970411 $157,500 118.60 2 2 1,328 1979 
2831139 20000811 $226,000 170.18 2 2 1,328 1979 
2831140 19880824 $115,000 73.34 2 2 1,568 1979 
2831142 19880830 $129,000 82.27 2 2 1,568 1977 
2831142 19980113 $155,000 98.85 2 2 1,568 1977 
2831142 19981215 $176,500 112.56 2 2 1,568 1977 
2831143 19900824 $239,000 142.86 2 2 1,673 1979 
2831144 19931124 $165,000 109.42 5 2 1,508 1979 
2831144 19970113 $156,500 103.78 5 2 1,508 1979 
2831144 20011004 $295,000 195.62 5 2 1,508 1979 
2831144 20031016 $391,500 259.62 5 2 1,508 1979 
2831148 19971016 $151,000 102.17 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
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2831148 20010525 $285,000 192.83 1.5 3 1,478 1977 
2831149 19921030 $170,000 85.34 2 2 1,992 1979 
2831150 19991029 $177,500 105.40 2 2 1,684 1980 
2831151 19910502 $160,000 95.64 2 2 1,673 1979 
2831151 19950619 $150,000 89.66 2 2 1,673 1979 
2831151 19960627 $152,500 91.15 2 2 1,673 1979 
2831152 19890606 $180,000 79.96 2 2 2,251 1980 
2831152 19961029 $182,000 80.85 2 2 2,251 1980 
2831153 19941017 $145,000 64.42 2 2 2,251 1980 
2831154 19961226 $183,000 81.30 2 2 2,251 1980 
2831155 19891128 $145,000 85.90 2 4 1,688 1979 
2831157 19880217 $165,000 93.43 2 3 1,766 1976 
2942211 19881222 $110,000 60.31 2 3 1,824 1969 
2942213 19931228 $80,000 113.31 1 2 706 1958 
2942213 19991027 $95,000 134.56 1 2 706 1958 
2942220 19990611 $129,000 111.98 2 4 1,152 1962 
2942221 20000811 $255,000 100.04 3.5 4 2,549 1984 
2942221 20030717 $419,000 164.38 3.5 4 2,549 1984 
2942223 19940325 $123,000 91.93 2 3 1,338 1971 
2942225 19940328 $175,000 109.79 2 3 1,594 1976 
2942226 19951101 $159,500 100.31 2 3 1,590 1958 
2942226 19990603 $182,000 114.47 2 3 1,590 1958 
2942228 19991130 $145,000 117.69 2 2 1,232 1964 
2942228 20050610 $555,000 450.49 2 2 1,232 1964 
3035102 19890228 $36,000 23.23 2 3 1,550 1976 
3035105 19901026 $147,000 101.87 2 3 1,443 1967 
3035105 19970903 $150,000 103.95 2 3 1,443 1967 
3035107 20000411 $184,500 108.21 2 3 1,705 1981 
3035116 20010222 $200,000 108.70 2 4 1,840 1957 
3035116 20030228 $325,000 176.63 2 4 1,840 1957 
3035117 20000210 $205,000 102.60 1 2 1,998 1957 
3035201 19960913 $95,000 107.47 1 2 884 1947 
3035205 19890404 $115,000 68.49 2 4 1,679 1976 
3035205 19990722 $150,000 89.34 2 4 1,679 1976 
3035206 20051216 $450,000 312.50 2 3 1,440 1976 
3035206 20070305 $575,000 399.31 2 3 1,440 1976 
3035207 20030502 $335,000 227.58 2 4 1,472 1974 
3035208 19991026 $63,000 34.24 2 5 1,840 1975 
3035210 20000406 $236,000 115.07 3 6 2,051 1957 
3035210 20020726 $385,000 187.71 3 6 2,051 1957 
3035212 20021007 $385,000 208.22 2 3 1,849 1972 
3035213 19981110 $166,500 87.82 2 2 1,896 1961 
3035213 20040427 $419,000 220.99 2 2 1,896 1961 
3035214 19891227 $99,000 66.00 2 3 1,500 1975 
3035214 19930727 $128,000 85.33 2 3 1,500 1975 
3035214 19970926 $133,000 88.67 2 3 1,500 1975 
3035225 19931118 $152,500 90.88 2 3 1,678 1981 
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3035225 19980626 $190,000 113.23 2 3 1,678 1981 
3035228 19970325 $34,000 47.22 1 2 720 1957 
3035229 19960815 $150,000 97.28 2 3 1,542 1976 
3035229 19991019 $194,500 126.13 2 3 1,542 1976 
3035302 19880404 $125,000 75.12 2 3 1,664 1976 
3035307 19900820 $145,000 99.59 2 3 1,456 1966 
3035308 19900905 $162,000 89.95 2 3 1,801 1982 
3035309 19971216 $120,000 151.52 1 2 792 1959 
3035310 20060830 $785,000 343.09 2 2 2,288 1981 
3035315 20050525 $114,000 55.80 2 3 2,043 1965 
3035315 20050705 $119,090 58.29 2 3 2,043 1965 
3036114 19910709 $150,000 119.24 2 3 1,258 1975 
3036119 19970829 $110,000 54.35 3 4 2,024 1969 
3036120 20000223 $299,000 149.50 3 4 2,000 2000 
3036121 19951010 $161,000 104.82 2 3 1,536 1976 
3036126 19970715 $94,500 82.03 1 3 1,152 1965 
3036128 19890920 $144,500 103.07 2 3 1,402 1983 
3036129 19900109 $188,000 134.29 2 3 1,400 1978 
3036129 19980724 $183,000 130.71 2 3 1,400 1978 
3036129 20021127 $459,000 327.86 2 3 1,400 1978 
3036133 19891120 $96,500 60.92 2 4 1,584 1975 
3036133 20050714 $515,000 325.13 2 4 1,584 1975 
3036133 20060907 $610,000 385.10 2 4 1,584 1975 
3036202 19911206 $135,000 107.40 2 3 1,257 1966 
3036202 20000921 $287,000 228.32 2 3 1,257 1966 
3036203 20050712 $595,000 425.61 2 4 1,398 1970 
3036205 20000229 $130,000 159.31 1 2 816 1963 
3036205 20071129 $237,163 290.64 1 2 816 1963 
3036205 20080409 $315,000 386.03 1 2 816 1963 
3036207 19880310 $103,000 67.59 2 3 1,524 1976 
3036210 19921005 $239,000 146.27 2 3 1,634 1959 
3036221 20001109 $150,000 100.94 2 3 1,486 1960 
3036221 20021018 $351,000 236.20 2 3 1,486 1960 
3036221 20021024 $290,000 195.15 2 3 1,486 1960 
3036223 19900711 $124,000 80.73 2 3 1,536 1976 
3036223 19981104 $145,000 94.40 2 3 1,536 1976 
3036307 19960628 $235,000 116.57 2 3 2,016 1982 
3036308 19931230 $189,500 106.28 2 3 1,783 1976 
3036310 19970321 $215,000 134.54 2 3 1,598 1976 
3036311 19981019 $176,500 98.49 2 4 1,792 1976 
3036311 20030408 $420,000 234.38 2 4 1,792 1976 
3036311 20050422 $582,500 325.06 2 4 1,792 1976 
3036312 19940413 $179,000 99.11 2 5 1,806 1976 
3036314 19950922 $165,000 89.29 2 4 1,848 1976 
3036314 20031126 $440,000 238.10 2 4 1,848 1976 
3040104 19890922 $185,000 90.33 2 3 2,048 1964 
3040104 19910411 $185,000 90.33 2 3 2,048 1964 
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3040104 19951106 $225,000 109.86 2 3 2,048 1964 
3040108 19971210 $34,500 35.20 1 2 980 1975 
3040108 20031024 $350,000 357.14 1 2 980 1975 
3040108 20080201 $480,000 489.80 1 2 980 1975 
3040112 19960705 $217,500 95.65 3.5 4 2,274 1976 
3040112 19980731 $250,000 109.94 3.5 4 2,274 1976 
3040115 19900522 $145,000 72.90 2 3 1,989 1974 
3040115 20031110 $495,000 248.87 2 3 1,989 1974 
3040120 19930514 $378,500 156.66 2.5 4 2,416 1976 
3040120 19971010 $426,000 176.32 2.5 4 2,416 1976 
3040126 19880708 $400,000 103.01 3 3 3,883 1980 
3040127 19930511 $225,000 81.17 2 3 2,772 1978 
3040127 19970702 $420,000 151.52 2 3 2,772 1978 
3040127 20020416 $526,500 189.94 2 3 2,772 1978 
3040137 20070518 $455,000 153.10 3 4 2,972 1967 
3040140 20060104 $582,000 485.00 2 2 1,200 1976 
3040141 19941118 $185,000 75.82 3 4 2,440 1960 
3040201 20070416 $985,000 246.25 4 7 4,000 1977 
3040203 19900816 $220,000 118.22 2 4 1,861 1974 
3040212 19930226 $415,000 166.80 2 3 2,488 1965 
3040308 19891108 $255,000 120.97 2 3 2,108 1970 
3040311 19981118 $305,000 125.15 2.5 3 2,437 1977 
3041114 19890531 $330,000 118.88 3.5 4 2,776 1987 
3058103 19980501 $200,000 114.94 2 5 1,740 1971 
    (Data Source: Data Quick) 
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Appendix B 
     South Lake Tahoe Residential Permits 
Year Permits Housing Stock 
1988 46 12,096 
 1989 29 12,142 
1990 70 12,171 
1991 170 12,241 
1992 87 12,411 
1993 115 12,498 
1994 109 12,613 
1995 94 12,722 
1996 117 12,816 
1997 91 12,933 
1998 94 13,024 
1999 81 13,118 
2000 90 13,199 
2001 98 13,289 
2002 120 13,387 
2003 168 13,507 
2004 139 13,675 
2005 114 13,814 
2006 108 13,928 
2007 234 14,036 
2008 - 14,270 
    (Data Source: Eldorado County Building Department) 
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Appendix C 
    Skier Visits   
 
Season CA (millions) Tahoe (millions) 
1987-88 6.9 3.7 
1988-89 7.1 3.9 
1989-90 6.4 3.5 
1990-91 4.2 2.3 
1991-92 6.2 2.9 
1992-93 6.2 3.5 
1993-94 6.2 3.4 
1994-95 7.1 4.1 
1995-96 5.5 3.2 
1996-97 5.8 3.4 
1997-98 7.4 4.4 
1998-99 7.4 4.4 
1999-00 6.5 4.0 
2000-01 7.4 4.1 
2001-02 7.4 4.1 
2002-03 7.5 4.1 
2003-04 7.5 4.4 
2004-05 8.1 4.6 
2005-06 7.8 5.1 
2006-07 6.3 4.2 
2007-08 7.2 4.1 
 
  
     (Data Source: California Ski Industry Association) 
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Appendix D 
    Heavenly Ski Resort Snowfall 
Year Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Total(in) 
87-88 - 8.00 52.50 42.00 - 6.00 - - 108.50 
88-89 - 23.00 40.50 22.50 37.50 74.00 2.50 - 200.00 
89-90 - 18.00 - 34.00 43.00 19.00 - - 114.00 
90-91 - 11.00 25.00 3.00 9.50 90.00 8.50 - 147.00 
91-92 24.00 15.00 19.50 10.00 34.00 20.00 - - 122.50 
92-93 14.00 2.00 128.00 88.00 66.00 28.00 18.00 - 344.00 
93-94 8.00 11.50 27.00 13.50 72.50 13.50 6.00 - 152.00 
94-95 7.00 105.00 39.50 101.50 8.00 121.00 42.50 31.00 455.50 
95-96 - 2.00 32.00 99.00 71.00 58.50 19.00 - 281.50 
96-97 17.00 8.00 124.00 108.00 8.00 11.00 1.00 - 277.00 
97-98 - 19.50 20.00 55.50 98.50 71.00 21.00 24.00 309.50 
98-99 6.00 26.50 33.00 69.00 105.00 40.00 65.25 10.00 354.75 
99-00 - 0.50 7.00 100.00 78.00 26.00 9.00 - 220.50 
00-01 - 16.00 16.00 33.00 59.00 16.50 45.50 - 186.00 
01-02 - 22.50 92.00 19.00 15.50 58.50 22.00 - 229.50 
02-03 - 8.00 137.25 4.00 19.00 17.00 - - 185.25 
03-04  30.00 88.50 37.50 58.50 16.00 2.00 - 232.50 
04-05 24.00 22.00 55.00 128.50 55.00 57.00 21.50 5.00 368.00 
05-06 - 10.00 113.50 70.00 43.00 91.50 46.50 - 374.50 
06-07 - - 23.00 22.00 92.00 28.00 35.00 - 200.00 
07-08 4.00 - 18.00 167.50 71.00 15.00 2.00 - 277.50 
     (Data Source: Heavenly Ski Resort) 
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